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This chapter explores an unappreciated psychological dimension of intellectual 
humility. In particular, I argue there is a plausible connection between intellectual 
humility and epistemic egocentrism. Epistemic egocentrism is a well-known 
cognitive bias – often called ‘the curse of knowledge’ – whereby an agent attributes 
his or her own mental states to other people. I hypothesize that an individual who 
exhibits this bias is more likely to possess a variety of traits that are characteristic of 
intellectual humility. This is surprising because intellectual humility is often 
regarded as an antidote to cognitive biases, whereas I claim that a particular 
cognitive bias (namely, the curse of knowledge) may help foster an intellectual 
virtue.  
 
Introduction 
Intellectual humility is widely considered a virtue.1 Although there is no consensus within 
philosophy or psychology on a precise definition of intellectual humility, it has been linked to an 
assortment of desirable traits. For example, intellectual humble people have been said to: not 
think too highly of themselves; not ascribe to themselves greater excellence than they possesses; 
show low concern for how special their talents are; take complaints and criticism seriously; 
generously acknowledge the contributions of others; and not demand special treatment, even 
                                                          
1 For example, see Church and Barrett (2016), Hazlett (2012), Roberts and Wood (2003), Samuelson et al. 
(2015), Tanesini (2018), and Whitcomb et al. (2017).  
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when deserving. This virtue has been studied by philosophers, psychologists, and theologians, 
and it seems to involve a mix of cognitive, emotional, behavioural, and motivational components.  
This chapter will explore a surprising and unappreciated psychological underpinning of 
intellectual humility. In particular, I will argue there is a plausible connection between intellectual 
humility and epistemic egocentrism.  
Epistemic egocentrism is a well-known cognitive bias whereby an agent attributes his or her own 
mental states to other people.2 For example, a brilliant professor who no longer remembers the 
difficulties that a young student encounters when learning a new subject, and who therefore 
mistakenly assumes that students will find difficult material easy to grasp, is being epistemically 
egocentric. Epistemic egocentrism is often called ‘the curse of knowledge’ because it can lead to 
suboptimal results in a variety of domains; for instance, imputing one’s knowledge to other 
people can make it difficult to teach novices and harder to communicate. Nevertheless, I want to 
consider the role that the imputation of one’s own knowledge to others might play in the 
possession of intellectual humility. The central question of this chapter is: are the epistemically 
egocentric more likely to be intellectually humble? I believe we have some reason to think so.  
 
Epistemic Egocentrism  
Let me first say a bit more about epistemic egocentrism. As mentioned above, it is a cognitive 
bias whereby we attribute our own mental states to other people, as well as our own past selves. 
Consider the fact that second-time readers of a good suspense novel will often overestimate the 
predictability of certain plot twists and character developments. This is because our privileged 
knowledge affects how we reimagine or re-experience various details of story. Once we know 
                                                          
2 Epistemic egocentrism may also be linked to other biases, such as the hindsight bias (where an event 
seems predictable after it has occurred) and the false consensus effect (where we tend to overestimate the 
commonness of our own beliefs and choices). See Nickerson (1999) for a review. 
 3 
something, we find it difficult to set aside our ‘privileged information’, which is information that 
we possess but others lack.3 Epistemic egocentrism is therefore a form a perspective-taking 
failure. 
In 1990, a Stanford graduate student in psychology named Elizabeth Newton illustrated this 
phenomenon with a simple game in which participants were assigned one of two roles: “tapper” 
or “listener”. Each tapper was asked to pick a well-known song, such as “Happy Birthday,” and 
tap out the rhythm on a table. The listener’s job was to guess the song. Tappers were also asked 
to predict how often the listener would guess correctly: they predicted 50%. But, in fact, the 
listeners were only able to guess three of the 120 songs—a success ratio of 2.5%.4 What explains 
this?  
Once you know something, it is very difficult to remember what it was like not to know it—to put 
yourself in the shoes of someone who lacks your knowledge. As a result, we become overly 
confident in other people’s cognitive abilities. To use a bit of philosophical jargon, we tend to 
assume that other people are in a stronger epistemic position than they really are. In the example 
of tappers and listeners, the tapper will hear the song in their head as they tap, but they will also 
forget what it was like to not have this privileged knowledge. As a result, they mistakenly assume 
that others will find the task easier than it is.  
The tendency to see the world from an epistemically egocentric perspective is a general feature 
of human cognition (see Nickerson 1999; Royzman et al. 2003). This explains why company 
employees will use acronyms that newcomers do not understand, why doctors use complex 
medical terms in discussion with patients, and why my girlfriend finds it so frustrating to play 
charades with me.  
                                                          
3 Privileged information could be about some publicly accessible fact to which others lack physical access 
(e.g. the location of a physical object), or it could be a fact of one’s private consciousness (e.g., an 
undisclosed thought). Privileged information may also be highly concrete or abstract.  
4 Reported in Heath and Heath (2006). 
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Epistemic egocentrism becomes ‘the curse of knowledge’ when it leads to suboptimal results. For 
example, it can interfere with our ability to communicate and explain, make it more difficult for 
others to learn from us, lead patients to misunderstand their doctors, and ruin family game night. 
To overcome our epistemically egocentric tendencies, we must somehow eschew our privileged 
knowledge. This calls for a two-step process: first, we must distinguish information that is to be 
retained (i.e. shared knowledge) from information that is to be disregarded (i.e. privileged 
information); second, we must inhibit the information that is to be disregarded.5 According to 
Johnson’s (1998) review of the literature, people have difficulty with both tasks. Furthermore, 
insufficient separation (the first step) and poor inhibition (the second step) are individually 
sufficient to yield an epistemically egocentric result.  
Epistemic egocentrism is often regarded as a curse, but the tendency to skew towards our own 
privileged viewpoint may not be entirely bad. As I advertised at the start of this chapter, I believe 
that epistemic egocentrism may help foster intellectual humility. To explain why, I must first 
review some key findings from the literature on intellectual humility.  
 
Intellectual Humility  
Although the study of intellectual humility is fairly new, philosophers and psychologists have 
already offered a variety of accounts of this virtue. Unfortunately, there is little agreement on 
how to define intellectual humility.6 Instead of providing a definition, I will briefly survey the 
literature and draw out a list of qualities commonly associated with intellectual humility.  
                                                          
5 See Johnson (1998) for a more detailed discussion.  
6 In his overview of the literature, Ballantyne (MS) writes: “researchers don’t concur on how to define 
intellectual humility precisely”. Likewise, Alfano et al. (2017) say: “no consensus emerges within philosophy 
or psychology on a precise definition of intellectual humility”. Nadelhoffer et al. (2017) make a similar 
observation.   
 5 
Let’s start with a traditional view of humility.7 According to this view, humility involves a low view 
of one’s accomplishments or self-worth. St. Thomas Aquinas, for example, says that being humble 
involves “self-abasement to the lowest place” ([1485] 1972). Likewise, Sidgwick says, “humility 
prescribes a low opinion of our merits” (1907/1962: 334) and the Oxford English Dictionary 
defines humility as “having a lowly opinion of oneself” (McAuthur 1998). Let’s call this the “low 
self-estimate view”.  
A low estimate of oneself may be accurate or not. Thus, the low self-estimate view actually 
bifurcates into two views. On the one hand, intellectual humility may require us to take a 
properly low view of ourselves. I will call this the “accurate low self-estimate view”. Consider, for 
instance, the following remark by Aquinas: “it is possible, without falsehood, to deem and avow 
oneself the most despicable of men … [and] without falsehood one may avow and believe oneself 
in all ways unprofitable and useless in respect of one's own capability” (st ii-ii Q. 161 Art. 6 ad.1).8 
On the other hand, intellectual humility may require us to underestimate our intellectual 
strengths and self-worth. As Julia Driver maintains, the humble person “is disposed to 
underestimate self-worth to some limited extent, in spite of the available evidence” (2001: 21).9 
Let’s call this the “underestimation view”. This view requires an inaccurate assessment of one’s 
accomplishments and abilities.10  
                                                          
7 I am here following many others (e.g. Roberts and Wood 2003) in assuming that intellectual humility is a 
sub-species of humility.  
8 In The Cloud of Unknowing, an anonymous work of Christian mysticism written in the 14th century, the 
author declares that humility is “nothing else but a true knowledge and experience of yourself as you are, a 
wretch, filth, far worse than nothing.” Similarly, Gabrielle Taylor (1985: 17) says, “the man who accepts his 
lowly position as what is due him is the man who has humility, or the humble man”. 
9 Driver is actually writing about modesty, not humility, but these two concepts are closely related. Indeed, 
some explicitly treat “modesty” and “humility” as interchangeable (Hare 1996, Garcia 2006, and Sinha 
2011). An empirical study has also shown that modesty is one of the core dimensions of humility (Alfano et 
al. 2017). See Allhoff (2009) for an attempt to distinguish humility from modesty.  
10 Underestimation does not actually require a low self-estimation because a humble person could still 
have “a rather high opinion of herself, just not as high as she is entitled to have” (Driver 2001: 19). It is 
therefore somewhat misleading to characterize the underestimation view as a low self-estimate view. Still, 
underestimation involves a relatively low self-estimate because it is low compared to what one is entitled. 
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The accurate low self-estimate view is often tied to a specifically religious conception of humility. 
This view makes sense in a religious context because it is easy to acknowledge our lowliness and 
insignificance in relation to God’s greatness (and presupposing original sin). For those who do not 
share certain religious beliefs, however, the claim that we are worthless, despicable, and corrupt 
will seem inaccurate. Indeed, this view of humility led Spinoza, Hume, Nietzsche, and Sidgwick to 
criticize humility and claim it is not a virtue.11 I will therefore set this view aside and focus on 
contemporary secular accounts of humility.  
The underestimation view gets something right about humility: it provides an antidote to pride 
and hubris. By all accounts, the intellectually humble lack the characteristic dispositions involved 
in excessive intellectual self-regard, such as pride, intellectual arrogance, and so on. But many 
philosophers think humility does not require us to undervalue ourselves and our capabilities.12 
This is because a person might recognize his or her accomplishments, skills, talents, etc. and yet 
still be humble about them, taking little pride in them. As Jorge Garcia (2006: 422) puts it, the 
issue seems to be about our “affective and volitional response” to our self-ascribed good 
features, not our “beliefs about them”. Thus, being humble does not seem to require mistaken 
beliefs or thinking poorly of oneself.  
Many scholars therefore prefer a conception of humility whereby the intellectually humble can 
recognize their own value and abilities, although they will not give these much thought or grant 
them much importance. As C.S. Lewis (2012) wrote, “Humility is not thinking less of yourself but 
thinking of yourself less”. Likewise, Roberts and Wood (2003: 271) characterize intellectual 
humility as 
an unusually low dispositional concern for the kind of status that accrues to persons who 
are viewed by their intellectual communities as intellectually talented, accomplished, and 
                                                          
11 See Nadelhoffer et al. (2017) for a fascinating overview of the tangled history of humility in theology and 
philosophy.  
12 See Garcia (2006) and Nadelhoffer et al. (2017), for example.  
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skilled, especially where such concern is muted or sidelined by intrinsic intellectual 
concerns.  
This definition has drawn considerable philosophical interest. According to this perspective, 
intellectual humility can be thought of as a low concern for status or self-importance, perhaps in 
addition to a high concern for knowledge and its various attributes (truth, justification, etc.). Let’s 
call this the “low self-concern view”.13  
A related view of humility is the “non-overestimation view”, where one is required to not 
overestimate one’s worth and accomplishments. Flanagan, for example, says the humble person 
“may have a perfectly accurate sense of her accomplishments and worth but she does not 
overestimate them” (1996: 176). Likewise, Richards says “being humble is not a matter of 
thinking that one’s accomplishments and virtues come literally to naught, but just of esteeming 
them no more highly than they deserve” (1992: xii).14 This conception of humility, unlike the 
underestimation view, does not require the humble person to be ignorant of (or inaccurate 
about) her worth and accomplishments. Rather, one must not distort or otherwise self-enhance 
to make oneself look and feel better.  
The inadequacy of the low self-estimation view, coupled with the plausibility of the low self-
concern view, might lead one to prefer Tangney’s (2000, 2009) account of humility. She says 
humility involves a moderate or accurate assessment of the self (i.e. not a low estimation and not 
an overestimation) as well as a low self-focus (i.e. a relative lack of preoccupation with one’s 
                                                          
13 We must be careful not to confuse low self-concern with a low estimation of oneself. An individual might 
have a high concern for status or self-importance and yet also have a very low estimation of their own 
status or importance. Thus, low self-concern and low self-estimation are not the same thing. It is also 
worth noting that the low self-concern view may be distinguished from the view that humility requires us 
to be unconcerned with the opinions of others (see Schueler 1997: 283; Roberts and Wood 2003: 261). It is 
plausible that the humble person generally does not care too much about whether others are impressed by 
her accomplishments or skills. But this is not a sufficient condition for humility, as illustrated by the 
Nietzschean overman’s disdain for others’ slights, praise, or fawning (see Garcia 2006: 423).  
14 Not overestimating one’s accomplishments and worth is not sufficient for humility. That would leave no 
middle ground for individuals who are neither arrogant nor humble. We need to make room for people 
who do not overestimate their own accomplishments and virtues and yet still are not humble.  
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accomplishments or worth). This seems to combine the low self-concern view with a secular 
version of the accurate self-estimate view (which is itself a version of the non-overestimation 
view). In addition, Tangney says humility is grounded in a willingness to acknowledge mistakes, 
intellectual openness, and a variety of other traits. She writes,  
the key elements of humility seem to include: an accurate assessment of one‘s abilities 
and achievements (not low self-esteem, self-deprecation), an ability to acknowledge 
one‘s mistakes, imperfections, gaps in knowledge, and limitations (often vis-à-vis a higher 
power); openness to new ideas, contradictory information, and advice; keeping one‘s 
abilities and accomplishments—one‘s place in the world—in perspective; a relatively low 
self-focus, a ―forgetting of the self... (2009) 
The idea that humility requires us to have an accurate view of the self has been picked up by 
others.15 This contrasts with the views of Lynch, Battaly, and Tanesini, who argue that intellectual 
humility does not require an accurate estimate of one’s intellectual strengths and weaknesses.  
The most plausible view, I think, is that one can neither overestimate one’s intellectual strengths 
nor underestimate them too badly, although a fully accurate self-estimate isn’t required. 
Following Ian Church (2016), we may characterize intellectual humility as a virtuous mean 
between intellectual arrogance (too high a self-estimate) and intellectual servility (too low a self-
estimate). But we need not take a firm stance on whether an accurate assessment of the self is 
necessary for humility. It is enough that humility is compatible with an accurate understanding of 
one’s values, worth, and accomplishments.16 
                                                          
15 For example, Gregg and Mahadevan (2014) say intellectual humility is “a realistic evaluation of one’s 
epistemic capacities”; Church and Barrett (2016) say intellectual humility is “the virtue of accurately 
tracking what one could nonculpably take to be the positive epistemic status of one’s own beliefs”; and 
Lavelock et al. (2014) say “humility involves having an accurate view of self, evidenced by honest self-
evaluation and willingness to accept one’s strengths and weaknesses.” 
16 Whitcomb et al. (2017) have argued that a low concern for one’s intellectual status is neither sufficient 
nor necessary for intellectual humility. For a reply, see Snow (2019) and Pritchard (2018). 
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I’ll wrap up this exploration of the literature on humility by drawing out some typical 
characteristics of the intellectually humble person. I do not pretend these are individually 
necessary or jointly sufficient, but I do claim that someone who exhibits a set of these qualities 
has something worth calling ‘intellectual humility’.  
The intellectual humble person will:  
 not think too highly of themselves or be too impressed by their admired features17  
 not think that one’s beliefs or attitudes are better or more correct than other 
viewpoints18 
 not show conceit or be arrogant, which stems from a high opinion of oneself19  
 not overestimate or exaggerate their good features or achievements20 
 show low concern for how special their talents are21 
 show low concern for how their intellect is perceived; i.e. will lack intellectual vanity22  
 not boast or brag about their intellectual accomplishments23 
 not demand (and often refuse to accept) special treatment or honors, even when 
deserving24 
 not be defensive when challenged or try to explain away their intellectual shortcomings25 
                                                          
17 Roberts and Wood (2003); Garcia (2006); Kellenberger (2010); Hill and Laney (2017: 243); Pritchard 
(2018).  
18 Tangney (2009); Toner et al. (2013); Krumrei-Mancuso and Rouse (2016).  
19 Roberts and Wood (2007); Kellenberger (2010); Church and Samuelson (2017); Lynch (2018). 
20 Flanagan (1996); Tangney (2000, 2009); Roberts and Wood (2003); Kellenberger (2010); Church and 
Samuelson (2017); Pritchard (2018); Tanesini (2018).  
21 Roberts and Wood (2003); Tangney (2009); Kellenberger (2010); Pritchard (2018).  
22 Roberts and Wood (2003); Tangney (2009); Kellenberger (2010); Alfano et al. (2017).  
23 Samuelson et al (2015); Tanesini (2018).  
24 Kellenberger (2010); Wright et al. (2017), Priest (2017: 470); Whitcomb et al. (2017: 17); Tanesini (2018).  
25 Van Tongernan et al. (2014); Samuelson et al. (2015); Krumrei-Mancuso and Rouse (2016); Whitcomb et 
al. 2017; Tanesini (2018). 
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 take complaints and criticism seriously, even when the criticizers are not authority 
figures26  
 acknowledge their mistakes and shortcomings27 
 have a propensity to defer to others28  
 generously acknowledge the contributions of others29 
 show open-mindedness to new ideas30 
 show concern for (or ‘own’) their intellectual limitations31 
 
This highlights the heterogeneity of behaviors and characteristics that philosophers and 
psychologists have taken to characterize intellectual humility. Given this heterogeneity, it is not 
surprising that several very different accounts of this virtue have been developed. I propose we 
take this heterogeneity at face value without succumbing to the philosophical urge—perhaps an 
imprint of Socrates’s legacy—to find some deeper underlying unity to them all.32 As far as I’m 
concerned, all these traits gesture at something that arguably deserves the label ‘intellectual 
humility’. We should therefore regard intellectual humility as a multifaceted and multilayered 
virtue.33 
                                                          
26 Roberts and Wood (2007); Hoyle et al. (2016); Priest (2017: 470); Whitcomb et al. (2017). 
27 Roberts and Wood (2007); Tangney (2009); Kellenberger (2010); Church and Samuelson (2017); 
Whitcomb et al. (2017); Tanesini (2018).  
28 Whitcomb et al. (2017).  
29 Tangney (2000); Kellenberger (2010); Tanesini (2018). 
30 Samuelson et al. (2015); Krumrei-Mancuso and Rouse (2016); Church and Samuelson (2017); Priest 
(2017: 470); Tanesini (2018).  
31 Tangney (2009); Whitcomb et al. (2017), Priest (2017: 470); Tanesini (2018).  
32 As Hill and Laney (2017: 245) say, “a complex combination of characteristics comprise the construct of 
humility”. Tangney (2000, 2009) also seems happy to accept the heterogeneity of intellectual humility. 
Tanesini (2018) acknowledges that intellectual humility is “a complex virtue” and its characteristics are 
therefore “a heterogeneous bunch”. But she still seeks an underlying unity.  
33 Following Kellenberger (2010), we might say humility is a “polythethic concept”. A polythetic concept 
applies to a class that is not defined by necessary and sufficient properties, but instead its members are 
marked by characteristics shared by many but not all instances (i.e. family resemblances). This does not 
prevent us from saying anything useful about intellectual humility. 
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Are the Epistemically Egocentric More Likely to Be Intellectually Humble?  
Now let’s return to the alleged connection between epistemic egocentrism and intellectual 
humility. My hypothesis is that epistemically egocentric individuals are more likely to possess a 
variety of traits that are characteristic of intellectual humility. Below I will explain why.   
At least one important dimension of intellectual humility is that one seems insensitive to, or 
unconcerned with, how truly special one’s aptitudes are. In addition, the intellectually humble 
person will not think too highly of herself or be too impressed by the features for which they she 
is admired. Imagine a brilliant philosopher who, when praised for her intellect by others, says 
(and genuinely believes): “I’m really not all that special. My colleagues are just as talented as I 
am, and any one of them might have solved the mind-body problem instead of me. It was just 
luck that the solution occurred to me. Also, my colleagues deserve just as much credit because 
they have been discussing this problem with me for years and they’ve steered my thinking in the 
right direction.”  Such a person seems genuinely intellectually humble in spite of her brilliance. 
What might explain why she is relatively insensitive to the specialness of her aptitudes?  
One way in which a person can achieve this hallmark of humility is by implicitly imbuing others 
with the sorts of aptitudes they do not really have, or by overrating the ease with which they 
could acquire such aptitudes.34 This is illustrated by the example of the brilliant professor, who 
seems to genuinely think that her colleagues are just as intelligent (they’re not) and could just as 
easily have achieved the same remarkable accomplishments (they couldn’t have). Notice, 
however, that by implicitly imbuing others with intellectual aptitudes they do not really have, our 
brilliant professor is being epistemically egocentric.35 She seems to automatically and implicitly 
                                                          
34 Royzman (2003) makes this point, but he doesn’t develop the idea.  
35 The literature on epistemic egocentrism often slides between talk of attributing one’s knowledge to 
others, one’s mental states to others, and one’s aptitudes to others. I interpret ‘epistemic egocentrism’ 
broadly to include any of these overattributions.  
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elevate her colleagues to her own rank of intelligence. This egocentric explanation seems 
especially plausible when we remember that humility requires us to not provide too low an 
assessment of our own intellectual strengths. After all, self-disparagement would explain why 
one does not think too highly of oneself or is not too impressed by one’s admirable features; but 
self-disparagement is (at least on many accounts) incompatible with humility. One cannot be 
intellectually servile and remain humble. Thus, we cannot appeal to self-disparagement to 
explain why the brilliant philosopher in our example is humble. To truly think she is “not so 
special”, she may therefore be overestimating the epistemic standing of others (rather than 
underestimating her own).  
This is just the stance of the more knowledgeable individual in the epistemic egocentrism 
paradigm. A participant is endowed with privileged information and asked to consider a situation 
from the perspective of someone who lacks that information. When we are being epistemically 
egocentric, we will find it difficult to imagine the world from the perspective of someone who 
lacks the information or intellectual aptitudes that we possess.36 As a result, we become overly 
confident in other people’s epistemic standing; viz., we mistakenly assume they are in a stronger 
epistemic position than is truly the case. And from the perspective of the less knowledgeable 
individual, it may seem like the gifted person is denying herself some well-deserved credit for her 
intellectual accomplishments. Thus, intellectual humility may just be epistemic egocentrism 
viewed from the perspective of another individual.  
                                                          
36 There is some work suggesting that humility is other-focused in a sense that requires taking other 
people’s point of view into account (Nadelhoffer and Wright 2017). This seems to contrast with my own 
view, which treats epistemic egocentrism as a form of perspective-taking failure. However, these views do 
have something in common: they both require a subject to consider the world from the perspective of 
another person. The crucial difference is that, on my account, the epistemically egocentric person 
mistakenly imputes others with her own mental states (e.g., knowledge) and then views herself from what 
she mistakenly assumes to be the perspective of another individual. Another important difference is that 
Nadelhoffer and Wright are providing an account of humility in general, not intellectual humility, so their 
focus is on “promoting and protecting others’ wellbeing and seek[ing] to make a difference when/where 
[one] reasonably can”. Finally, they characterize a high other-focus in part as “recognition of the value of 
others” and “openness to new ideas”, and my account does explain why the epistemically egocentric 
person would exhibit this behavior.  
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This hypothesis has a lot of explanatory power, for it can explain a variety of qualities that are 
characteristic of intellectual humility. As noted earlier, an intellectually humble person will tend 
not to think her beliefs or attitudes are better than the views of others. We might explain this by 
appealing to the fact that an epistemically egocentric outlook will lead one to view other 
perspectives as similar to one’s own, and therefore on an epistemic par. It is the nature of belief 
that we cannot regard our own beliefs as false, so an epistemically egocentric individual will tend 
to think others’ views are accurate too. This would lead one to think their own beliefs are not 
better or more correct than those of others.  
This attitude will also operate as a natural check on conceit or arrogance, which stems from 
having a high opinion of oneself. If an intelligent person is epistemically egocentric, she may not 
think too highly of herself or be too impressed by her admired features; thus, she will have no 
grounding for conceit or arrogance. As a result, she will also be less likely to boast or brag about 
her intellectual accomplishments. Further, implicitly attributing impressive intellectual aptitudes 
to others (or overrating the ease with which they could acquire these aptitudes) would explain 
why the intellectually humble person would not demand—and often refuse to accept—special 
treatment or honors, even when deserving. It is because she genuinely does not believe that she 
merits such treatment or honors in comparison with others.  
It is useful, at this point, to distinguish egocentrism from egoism and egotism. Egoism is the 
tendency to be motivated by self-interest, while egotism is the tendency to perceive oneself in 
excessively favourable ways. In the epistemic case, the egotistic person will tend to regard their 
own beliefs as better and more likely to be true than those of others. This can lead to arrogance. 
Intellectually humility, however, involves a lack of egotism and a low degree of self-centeredness 
in the domain of intellectual life (Leary and Terry 2012). Thus, if my hypothesis about the 
connection between egocentrism and humility is right, we can expect epistemically egocentric 
people to be less epistemically egotistic because intelligent people who are epistemic egocentric 
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will not think too highly of themselves or be too impressed by their achievements. In short, the 
epistemically egocentric may be less likely to be epistemically egotistic.37  
According to some scholars, intellectually humble people are also less likely to talk about what 
they know, are more likely to show curiosity and open-mindedness, are willing to take complaints 
and criticism seriously (even when the criticizers are not authority figures), and have an increased 
propensity to defer to others. These characteristics may also be explained, at least partially, by an 
epistemically egocentric stance. For example, we may be less motivated to talk about our 
knowledge if we assume that others already know what we do. After all, I needn’t tell you that 
the U.S. House of Representatives just passed a spending bill with $5 billion for Trump’s border 
wall if I think you already know this.38 Further, epistemically egocentric people may remain 
curious and open-minded because one who thinks their knowledge is not so special is less likely 
to be complacent with what they know. In contrast, someone who thinks they are smarter than 
everyone else may be less driven to seek new knowledge. In addition, one who is overly 
confident in other people’s epistemic standing may be more willing to accept feedback from 
others, including critical feedback from people who are not actually experts or authority figures 
in the relevant domain. Presumably, one who thinks their interlocutor is far less intelligent or 
knowledgeable about some issue will have less of an (epistemic) reason to heed their advice, and 
thus be less willing to defer to their judgment. By assuming that others have more epistemic 
authority than they do, the epistemically egocentric individual may be more willing to take their 
advice and defer to the judgment of others. This would also explain why the intellectually humble 
do not have a propensity to treat their intellectual inferiors relatively poorly on the basis of their 
                                                          
37 This fits nicely with Roberts and Wood’s (2003, 2007) claim that humility is opposite of egotism.  
38 I do not mean to imply that people only tell others things they presume are unknown to the listener. 
Various motivations may promote the discussion of information that is presumed to be common ground. 
However, I am following Grice’s (1975) maxim of quantity, which states that cooperative conversational 
partners will not provide redundant information or more information than is necessary.  
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intellectual inferiority (Whitcomb et al. 2017: 17). Indeed, it may explain why the intellectually 
humble agent has a deep respect for her intellectual community (Priest 2017: 470).  
According to Priest (2017: 427), the intellectually humble person “sees himself in the same light 
as he sees all others.” This comes very close to describing what happens when one exhibits the 
bias of epistemic egocentrism. But rather than seeming himself in the same light as he sees all 
others, the epistemically egocentric individual will see others as he sees himself. In other words, 
“intellectual humility is exemplified in treating the intellect of others like the intellect of one’s 
own” (ibid). Although there may be occasions when he mentions his own intellectual aptitudes or 
achievements, he is just as likely to mention the aptitudes or achievements of others. Further, it 
is not incompatible with humility to have an accurate view of the strength of one’s own epistemic 
position (as discussed in the previous section). But the humble person may have an inaccurate 
view of the epistemic standing of others. Again, this would explain why humble people do not 
consider their own accomplishments very special, even though they do not have too low an 
opinion of their own intellectual aptitudes or achievements.  
Thus, while there is a sense in which it is right to say the intellectual humble “recognize the limits 
of their own knowledge” (i.e. they do not exaggerate their own epistemic standing), there is also 
a sense in which the intellectually humble might fail to appreciate the limits of their knowledge 
(i.e. they may attribute too much epistemic authority to others). By extending our knowledge or 
intellectual aptitudes too far, we draw inaccurate boundaries between the contents and 
capacities of our own minds and those of others.  
None of this is to say that epistemic egocentrism is necessary or sufficient for intellectual 
humility. We can easily imagine, for instance, an epistemically egocentric person who is quite 
arrogant. Consider my friend Byron, who loves to play charades and yet consistently 
overestimates how easy it will be for others to guess the answers to his wild gesticulations. Byron 
is being epistemically egocentric; but his egocentrism does not prevent him from also thinking 
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he’s far better at charades than everyone else, nor does it stop him from making others feel 
inadequate for being unable to guess the correct answer. He often says things like, “I’m the best 
at charades” and “I almost never lose at this game” despite the fact that both these claims are 
entirely false. Thus, I am neither claiming that intellectual humility requires epistemic 
egocentrism, nor am I claiming that epistemic egocentrism is sufficient for intellectually humility. 
Rather, I am claiming that we should expect epistemic egocentrism and intellectual humility to 
correlate: we have reason to think that epistemically egocentric individuals are more likely to 
possess a variety of traits that are characteristic of intellectual humility.  
 
Virtues and Biases  
A virtue is an excellent trait of character. We value the virtues because they tend to make people 
better or bring about valuable states of affairs. A moral virtue, for instance, normally helps make 
people, either constitutively or causally, good morally. Presumably, then, an intellectual virtue is 
a trait that normally helps to make people good epistemically. And yet cognitive biases, such as 
epistemic egocentrism, are often regarded as epistemic shortcomings. Is this a problem for my 
view? Can a cognitive bias give rise to an intellectual virtue?  
I see no reason to think not. It might be dubious to claim that a cognitive bias is itself an 
intellectual virtue. This would require us to regard a bias, such as epistemic egocentrism, as an 
excellent character trait. But I am not claiming that epistemic egocentrism is a virtue. Rather, my 
claim is that epistemic egocentrism may explain the presence of certain traits that are 
characteristic of intellectual humility. Consider an analogy. According to some recent 
neuroscience, forgetfulness is a sign of greater intelligence (Richards and Frankland 2017). The 
explanation, roughly, is that smarter people will tend to forget irrelevant details and instead 
focus on things that will help them make decisions in the real world. Let’s suppose this is correct. 
In this case, we may regard intelligence as a virtue without thereby admitting that forgetfulness is 
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a virtue. The point is that forgetfulness (something we generally regard as an epistemic 
shortcoming) is correlated with higher intelligence (something we regard as a virtue). We may 
still value intelligence without valuing forgetfulness; likewise, we may value intellectual humility 
without thereby valuing epistemic egocentrism.39  
An interesting project would be to explore how intellectual humility correlates with other 
cognitive biases. Many authors have assumed that intellectual humility will diminish certain 
biases (e.g., Whitcomb et al. 2017; Samuelson and Church 2015; Ballantyne MS), but it is worth 
asking precisely how it would function as a corrective to flawed cognitive processing. I will not 
pursue this question here.40  
 
Limitations of My Account 
I have argued that epistemic egocentrism can explain why an individual would possess a variety 
of traits that are characteristic of intellectual humility. In a chapter on humility, however, it is 
only fitting to discuss some limitations of my account. For example, epistemic egocentrism will 
not explain the motivational component of intellectual humility whereby an individual pursues 
knowledge more for the sake of knowledge than for the sake of social esteem, prestige, 
admiration from others, or general self-enhancement. If one thinks that intellectual humility 
requires one to “love truth for its own sake”, then epistemic egocentrism seems poorly equipped 
to explain this component of humility. Further, epistemic egocentrism doesn’t seem to 
sufficiently capture other qualities that are sometimes associated with intellectual humility, such 
as a stable sense of self-worth, being aware and forgiving of human intellectual shortcomings, 
and not being envious of others’ successes (Tanesini 2018).  
                                                          
39 The analogy holds up in another way: it would be mistaken to claim that forgetfulness is either necessary 
or sufficient for high intelligence, just as it would be mistaken to claim that epistemic egocentrism is either 
necessary or sufficient for intellectual humility.  
40 See Samuelson and Church (2015: 1101-2, 1106-7) for more discussion.  
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Epistemic egocentrism may also lead one to seem less intellectually humble in certain 
circumstances. For example, a speaker who overestimates what his listeners know may talk over 
their heads, which might seem in tension with being humble. Consider the scholar who uses 
academic jargon, or makes reference to obscure historical figures, in conversation with people 
who have no expertise in the relevant area.41 Such a person may seem pretentious or 
intellectually snobbish. Further, it is often said that open-mindedness is a central trait of 
intellectual humility, but epistemic egocentrism may sometimes lead one to be less open to the 
opinions of others; for instance, one might be less willing to consider the opinions of others if one 
thinks other people already know what she knows. Finally, it may be true that some people are 
better at inhibiting epistemic egocentrism than others, and perhaps humility is something that 
could facilitate this. Thus, the relationship between intellectual humility and epistemic 
egocentrism may be more complicated than I have explored here. 
An area for future study is intellectual humility in young children. The developmental literature is 
replete with studies that document epistemic egocentrism in young children, so my view should 
predict that children would likely exhibit the same characteristics of intellectual humility. I do not 
have space to explore this topic here, but it is worth pointing out that young children do seem 
incredibly open-minded, willing to defer to others, unconcerned with how special their talents 
are, and tend to lack intellectual vanity. We are also told that Jesus Christ made the following 
remark: “Truly, as I say to you, unless you turn and become as children, you will never enter the 
kingdom of Heaven. Whoever humbles himself like a child, he is the greatest in the kingdom of 
Heaven” (Matthew 18:3-4, emphasis mine). So at least some people seem to think children 
exemplify humility.  
 
                                                          
41 As we all know, in 1642 Ambrose Gascoigne observed this phenomenon, but he called it ‘proiectura 
mentis’.  
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Conclusion 
I have argued that an epistemically egocentric individual is perhaps more likely to possess a 
variety of traits that are characteristic of intellectual humility. This is noteworthy because 
intellectual humility is often regarded as an antidote to cognitive biases, whereas I claim that an 
epistemically egocentric bias may help foster an intellectual virtue. I do not claim to have 
substantiated this conjecture in a conclusive way, but I hope to have lent some credence to it. 
The philosophical and psychological work on intellectual humility is vigorous and ongoing, but still 
in its infancy. I hope the work reviewed here suggests a promising avenue for further exploration.  
 
  
 20 
Works Cited 
Alfano, M, Iurino, K., Stey, P., Robinson, B., Christen, M., Yu, F. and & Lapsley, D. (2017). 
Development and validation of a multi-dimensional measure of intellectual humility. PLoS ONE 12 
(8): e0182950.  
Allhoff, F. (2009). What Is Modesty? International Journal of Applied Philosophy 23 (2): 165-187.  
Anonymous. (1981). The Cloud of Unknowing, trans. James Walsh. Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist Press. 
Aquinas, St. T. ([1485] 1972).Summa Theologiae, vol. 44, trans. Thomas Gilby. Cambridge, UK: 
Blackfriars. 
Ballantyne, Nathan (MS). Intellectual Humility: A Brief Introduction.  
Church, I. (2016). The Doxastic Account of Intellectual Humility. Logos and Episteme 7 (4): 413-
433. 
Church, I. M. & Barrett, J. (2016). Intellectual Humility. In E. L. Worthington Jr., D. E. Davis, & J. N. 
Hook (Eds.), Handbook of Humility: Theory, Research, and Applications. Routledge.   
Church, I. M. & Samuelson, P. L. (2017). Intellectual Humility: An Introduction to the Philosophy 
and Science. Bloomsbury Academic. 
Driver, J. (2001). Uneasy Virtue. Cambridge University Press. 
Flanagan, O. (1996). Self-expression. Oxford University Press. 
Garcia, J. L. A. (2006). Being unimpressed with ourselves: Reconceiving humility. Philosophia 34 
(4): 417-435. 
Gregg, A. P. and Mahadevan, N. (2014). Intellectual Arrogance and Intellectual Humility: An 
Evolutionary-Epistemological Account. Journal of Psychology and Theology 42: 7-18.  
 21 
Grice, H. P. (1975). Logic and Conversation. In P. Cole and J. Morgan (Eds.), Syntax and Semantics. 
Academic Press.  
Hare, S.  (1996) The Paradox of Moral Humility. American Philosophical Quarterly 33 (2): 235-241. 
Hazlett, A. (2012). Higher-Order Epistemic Attitudes and Intellectual Humility. Episteme 9 (3): 
205-223. 
Heath, C. & Heath, D. (2006). The Curse of Knowledge. Harvard Business Review. 
Hill, P. C., & Laney, E. K. (2017). Beyond self-interest: Humility and the quieted self. In K. W. 
Brown & M. R. Leary (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of hypo-egoic phenomena. Oxford University 
Press. 
Hoyle, R., Davisson, E., Diebels, K. & Leary, M. (2016). Holding specific views with humility: 
Conceptualization and measurement of specific intellectual humility. Personality and Individual 
Differences 97: 165-172.  
Kellenberger, J. (2010). Humility. American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (4): 321-336. 
Krumrei-Mancuso, E. & Rouse, S. (2016). The Development and Validation of the Comprehensive 
Intellectual Humility Scale. Journal of Personality Assessment 98 (2): 209-221.  
Lavelock, C. R., Worthington, Jr., E., Davis, D., Griffin, B., Reid, C., Hook, J., & Daryl R. Van 
Tongeren. (2014). The Quiet Virtue Speaks: An Intervention to Promote Humility. Journal of 
Psychology and Theology 42: 99–110.  
Leary, M. R., & Terry, M. L. (2012). Hypo-egoic mindsets: Antecedents and implications of 
quieting the self. In M. R. Leary, M. R. Leary, J. P. Tangney (Eds.) Handbook of self and identity 
(2nd ed.). Guilford Press, pp. 268-288. 
Lewis, C. S. (Source: thesecertainthings) September 2012 3:09 pm 20 notes http:// 
thesecertainthings.tumblr.com/post/31873965746/humility-is-not-thinking-less-of-yourself-but. 
 22 
Lynch, M. (2018). Arrogance, truth and public discourse. Episteme 15 (3): 283-296. 
McArthur, T. (1998). Oxford English dictionary. Concise oxford companion to the English 
language. Retrieved January 09, 2015, from Encyclopedia.com. http://www.encyclopedia. 
com/doc/1O29- oxfordenglishdictionary.html 
Nadelhoffer, T., Wright, J. C., Echols, T., and Venezia, K. (2017). Some Varieties of Humility Worth 
Wanting. Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (1): 168-200.  
Nadelhoffer, T., & Wright, J. C. (2017). The Twin Dimensions of the Virtue of Humility: Low Self-
Focus and High Other-Focus. In W. Sinnott-Armstrong and C. B. Miller (Eds.), Moral Psychology: 
Virtues and Vices. Cambridge: MIT Press.  
Nickerson, R. S. (1999). How We Know—And Sometimes Misjudge—What Others Know: Imputing 
One’s Own Knowledge to Others. Psychological Bulletin 125: 737-759. 
Priest, M. (2017). Intellectual Humility: An Interpersonal Theory. Ergo: An Open Access Journal of 
Philosophy 4. 
Pritchard, D. (2018). Intellectual humility and the epistemology of disagreement. Synthese. Online 
First: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-02024-5 
Richards, B. and Frankland, P. (2017). The Persistence and Transience of Memory. Neuron 94 (6): 
1071-1084.  
Richards, N. (1992). Humility. Temple University Press. 
Roberts, R. and Wood, J. (2007). Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology. Oxford 
University Press. 
Roberts, R. and Wood, J. (2003). Humility and epistemic goods. In L. Zagzebski & M. DePaul (Eds.), 
Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press.  
 23 
Royzman, E. B., Cassidy, K. W., & Baron, J. (2003). "I know, you know": Epistemic egocentrism in 
children and adults. Review of General Psychology, 7(1): 38-65. 
Samuelson, P. L., & Church, I. M. (2015). When cognition turns vicious: Heuristics and biases in 
light of virtue epistemology. Philosophical Psychology 28 (8): 1095-1113. 
Samuelson P. L., Jarvinen, M., Paulus, T., Church, I. M., Hardy, S., & Barrett, J. (2015). Implicit 
theories of intellectual virtues and vices: A focus on intellectual humility. Journal of Positive 
Psychology 10 (5): 389–406.  
Schueler, G. F. (1997). Why Modesty Is a Virtue. Ethics 107: 467-85. 
Sidgwick, H. 1907/1962. The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. University of Chicago Press. 
Sinha, G.A. (2011). Modernizing the Virtue of Humility. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2): 
259–274.  
Snow, N. (2019). Intellectual Humility. In H. Battaly (Ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Virtue 
Epistemology. Routledge.    
Tanesini, A. (2018), Intellectual Humility as Attitude. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 
96: 399-420.  
Tangney, J. (2000). Humility: Theoretical Perspectives, Empirical Findings, and Directions for 
Future Research. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology 19: 70-82. 
Tangney, J. (2009). Humility. In S. J. Lopez and C. R. Snyder (Eds.), Oxford handbook of positive 
psychology. Oxford University Press.  
Taylor, G. (1985). Pride, Shame and Guilt. Clarendon Press. 
Toner, K., Leary, M. R., Asher, M. W., & Jongman-Sereno, K. P. (2013). Feeling Superior Is a 
Bipartisan Issue: Extremity (Not Direction) of Political Views Predicts Perceived Belief Superiority. 
Psychological Science 24 (12): 2454-2462. 
 24 
Van Tongeren, D., Davis, D., & Hook, J. (2014). Social benefits of humility: Initiating and 
maintaining romantic relationships. The Journal of Positive Psychology 9 (4): 313-321.  
Whitcomb, D., Battaly, H., Baehr, J., & Howard‐Snyder, D. (2017). Intellectual Humility: Owning 
Our Limitations. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3): 509-539. 
Wittgenstein, L. (1964). Blue and Brown Books. Blackwell. 
Wright, J.C., Nadelhoffer, T., Ross, l. T., & Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2018.) Be it ever so humble: 
Proposing a dual-dimension account and measurement of humility. Self and Identity 17 (1): 92-
125.  
 
 
